economy and are able to behave a lot like nationals; in Japan they do neither. Substantial reciprocity is needed here before we can entertain the notion of global companies. In this particular debate Japan is not a trivial exception to an otherwise solid general rule. It is one third of the game, and far more than that in terms of pressures, changes and future developments.
Ownership is not the critical consideration; behavior is. But behind behavior and shaping it lie influence and control. Corporate behavior --what companies do and don't do within a country and with that country's people --directly determines the wealth and power of that country. Ownership, we have learned in this era of takeovers, has a non-trivial relation to influencing corporate behavior. Also, when circumstances get exceptional, even the most global of Multinationals take orders from their home governments. The constrained response of American based MNCs to the proposed Soviet-European gas pipeline a few years ago is an instructive example. So are the numerous problems European companies have had with U.S.
based suppliers of advanced technologies on questions of U.S. government notions of "Dual Use
Technologies." The very recent story of Mineba, the Japanese ball bearing company, purchasing and then systematically closing down U.S. capability in miniature ball bearings for what was presumably its own strategic reasons --despite assurances to the contrary (to the U.S. government in general and the Pentagon in particular) --is another example that should give pause.
3 Ownership and nationality often do matter. Similarly, asymmetries in Host country rules can have magnified effects through the instrument of the foreign based MNC. For example, the U.S. has neither formal nor de facto "domestic content" controls. The U.S. also has a unique comparative advantage in plant closings and lay-offs; it is hugely easier to close a plant or fire a large number of workers in the U.S. than in France, or Germany or Japan. A Japanese based multinational, for example, may find advantageous business reasons quite in harmony with the wishes of its Home government (whether formally expressed or not) when business conditions turn sour, and "rationalization" is needed. It is quite likely that under these conditions the U.S. will find itself absorbing a disproportionately high share of layoffs and plant closings, far more than simple "economic" reasons would have dictated, and far more than would have occurred had the U.S. plants not been controlled by a multinational, or even by a Multinational based in that particular Home country. commercial technology in the U.S. is developed in small and medium sized companies; one can buy them. In American Universities the latest in technology is provided to all comers. None of these channels is particularly important in Japan where technology tends to stay in large corporate groups until it comes out as product. Most European nations are closer to the U.S. than the Japanese model. These fundamental differences in the institutional structures of nations do not represent differences of goodness and badness, and no nation seems willing to change such fundamental structures. But the asymmetry has enormous consequences. It is into this critical asymmetry that foreign investment enters and must be judged.
A simple universal rule will not suffice, nor is it needed. The problems surrounding direct foreign investment are not universal in scope or invariate in form. They are quite narrow in scope and depend upon very particular circumstances for their meaning. In substantive terms we are usually concerned not with all investments coming from all nations into all industries, but with direct investment by companies of U.S., Japanese and European nationalities. Furthermore, our concerns will focus far more on the Japanese than on the Americans or Europeans, and even more narrowly to a small set of Japanese Keiretsu companies rather than companies of Japanese nationality in general. Finally, those concerns narrow to a reasonably small set of sectors and technologies: we are more concerned with silicon chips than potato chips, with real time control than with real estate, with flat panel rather than fashion displays. Europe and the U.S. should equip themselves with a capability to analyze the meaning of critical, direct foreign investment for their national objectives. (Japan already has more than enough of such an apparatus.) They should have the capability to act flexibly to encourage (or discourage or harmonize) such investments with their national objectives. America does not have such a capability; more important, it adamantly refuses to develop one, or to pay any attention whatever to existing governmental capabilities. Europe should not follow America's example.
In sum, though competition has become multi-national, the economic landscape is not yet "global." The world is not yet round and clean and free of political constraints and untouched by the effects of national industrial strategies. As we shall see below, governments still matter to the outcomes of international competition, perhaps more than ever!
I. 2. The New Nature of International Competition.
International competition has changed as much in its nature as in its extent. The important change is not, as it is commonly put, a geographic shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Rather, it concerns the rise of the Developmental State and its impacts upon the world trade and development system. 4 The Development State defines a new set of arrangements between the State, society and industry, designed to change the structure of the nation's comparative advantage. It was, of course, first and most effectively developed in Japan; but it is now being imitated, with varying degrees of success, in several countries. Japan pioneered a set of institutional innovations. These include: a) the State operating as a Gatekeeper to determine what can enter the Japanese economy (and under what conditions), including technology, and direct investment as well as product b) a Keiretsu system that creates loose "virtual integration"
at a massive new scale and c) a capability to target key technologies, and promote domestic industry, by channeling cheap capital and by promoting lively (but controlled) competition among Japanese companies and encouraging early forays into outside markets to hone competitiveness.
The result is not simply that Japan runs a surplus in its balance of payments, or that the United States has been running deficits. That is a macroeconomic matter. The important result of this fundamental change in the system is strategic. It is to be found in the composition of trade and the resulting rate and structure of industrial development. Its significance lies in the cumulative creation, over time, of a new and superior structure of comparative (and competitive) advantage in Japan and a corresponding weakening of those capabilities in its trading partners. It also has a system effect on the world trade and development system.
The post-war international trade regime was based upon two fundamental ideas: trade would be intra-sectoral, and direct foreign investment through multinational corporations would -9 -be a major vehicle of market penetration. Both would operate on a large scale without devastating the industrial and social landscapes of trading partners. As tables 1--4 indicate, Japan is an exception to the fundamental pattern of trade on which the post war international economic order was predicated, that is, intra-sectoral specialization. These tables show manufactured exports and imports for France, Germany, the United States and Japan, ranked as a share of total exports.
For both France and Germany, for example, automobiles are the leading export accounting for over 6% of total manufactured exports for France and about 9% for Germany.
The important point, however, is that automobiles are also one of the highest import sectors in both France and Germany. The tables demonstrate a pattern of substantial imports in those same sectors in which the nation is a strong exporter. For France, five of the top ten import categories are among the top ten export categories. The Japanese pattern is fundamentally and distinctively different. Crudely put, Japan does not import in those sectors in which it is a major exporter. In none of the top ten export categories are imports as much as one per cent of exports. There are many possible explanations for this distinctive and system destabilizing pattern. They are not our immediate concern here. The effects, however, are: sub-sector specialization, or intrasectoral trade, is at the heart of modern trade theory. It is, in fact, what has permitted international trade to grow, often faster than GNP in the post war period, in ways that have been largely beneficial to all parties without creating a predatory pattern of large, sectoral devastations among trading partners. Absent that pattern of intra-sectoral trade, international trade becomes a process of one nation wiping out large sectors (e.g., autos) in another. It becomes fundamentally predatory and unstable.
The MNC, not simple imports and exports, was the post war device for Transatlantic economic penetration and technology transfer without economic devastation. Acting as gatekeeper, the Japanese State was able to break up the package of product, technology, capital and control that is the Multinational corporation, and to reassemble those pieces in Japan, under Japanese control. With a handful of conspicuous exceptions, neither American nor European
MNCs were able to leverage their early lead in technology, quality and volume into sustainable major market positions in Japan. Advantages in product innovation could quickly be nullified in the Japanese market, where scale and scope economies would accumulate, and the outcome would be decided as a manufacturing game. This story was repeated in sector after sector, in automobiles, in consumer electronics, in semiconductors. Japan is changing. The capital market
is much more open now than it was just a few years ago, and with real consequences. But despite rapid change, the fundamental pattern is still very much in place, especially in new targeted industries.
I. 3. Revolution in the Organization of Production:
The second set of epochal changes that drives the transition in the international economy is of a different nature. This is a fundamental change in complex manufacturing, a change of revolutionary import in the process of production. Though largely a Japanese innovation, this revolutionary change in complex manufacturing is in no way bound by national policy, ethnicity or culture. Like the mass production revolution which preceded it on the trajectory of cutting edge industrial development and which had its origins in the United States, this new approach, which we can call high-volume flexible production, or velocity production, or "lean" production, can be learned by Europeans. The problem is that despite many important exceptions, they have not yet learned it. And they must. For volume flexible production commands a decisive competitive advantage over traditional mass production and it strikes at the heart of the wealth generating activities of the advanced nations: complex manufacturing, producing automobiles, trucks, washing machines, televisions --a truly vast array of products.
Why is it of fundamental importance and not just an easily overcome problem? Because it is not a quickly learned gimmick, nor is it embodied in machinery that can be purchased, nor can its cumulating advantages over traditional mass production be overcome by intensified investment in mass production combined with cheaper labor. It must be learned and developed through massive and painful organizational change. And it commands in its realm a truly decisive advantage over traditional mass production, even when well done, as by the best European auto producers. In automobiles, lean production uses less of everything compared with mass production: half the number of human work hours in the factory, half the manufacturing space, half the investment in tools and machinery, half the engineering hours to develop a new product, and half the time to develop that product. It also requires less than half the needed inventory on site, turns out products with far fewer defects, and producers a greater and growing variety of products." 6 It is, in brief, almost as decisive an advantage over mass production in its core realm as mass production was over craft production. It may have similarly potent consequences for the competitive positions of nations, and for the organization of society. 
I. 4. High Volume Flexible Production:
Craft production came first. It was Europe's great strength. The craft producer uses highly skilled workers and simple but flexible tools. Products are customized to demand. Each unit is expensive. Claims are often made for their high quality, which usually resides in hard to measure attributes. But aside from special, luxury ingredients (equally available to velocity producers), and hang on features (also equally available), those claims, as in the case of "crafted" mass production European luxury cars, are over inflated.
Mass production began in the U.S. in the early 19th century with the production of interchangeable parts for guns in response to shortages of skilled gunsmiths. Almost a century later Henry Ford put all the pieces together: interchangeable parts; a minute division of the work process; complex, expensive and specialized machinery; a moving assembly line; highly trained and highly specialized people to design the product, and to design, organize and run the production process; and large numbers of unskilled (or low skilled) people to perform the simplest, most minutely choreographed tasks of making the product.
Fordism, as European sociologists are fond of calling this system, conquered the territory once occupied by craft production. Its economic advantages were simply stupendous: almost 90% less direct labor per vehicle when compared with the most advanced form of craft production (which used interchangeable parts) and unlike craft production it had a potential for steady improvement through automation. 5 Fordism became the model of how to produce in an advanced economy and came (after Word War II) to dominate European production as well. But not before creating a huge disparity in wealth and power between the U.S. and Europe. Mass production meant volume production of standardized products for what was an unusually homogeneous as well as vast market; and it made that market ever more homogeneous. It meant high productivity and high wages for unskilled and skilled labor and cheap, quality products --formerly obtainable only by the rich --to buy with those high wages. Around the mass production system a vast array of social structures came into being from the industrial union to defend workers conditions through the business school to teach "management," that is, the systematic coordination and measurement of complex organization at a hithertofore unknown scale. Mass production gave our institutions and even our societies their present form; that is the main reason it is proving so difficult to change in fundamental ways and at a vast scale.
Simply put, mass production was the greatest production system in the history of the world. It won the war; it won the peace by dissolving social conflicts in a rising tide of consumer goods. It catapulted America into a unique position of overweening economic, military, political and cultural power. It had, however, its weakness. It was terribly inflexible.
Products could not be changed easily. Truly massive accumulations of capital, massive bureaucratic planning and, especially, very long production runs were its well known secrets.
And the runs were long. In the heyday of the system, 1955, some seven million cars were made in the U.S.. And despite a plethora of models and styles some eighty per cent of those cars were variants of just six models. 6 That was also the year when the U.S. auto industry produced almost three quarters of all the world's automobiles. Its share began to fall steadily for good, not bad, reasons. By the late 1950s recovery was long completed in Europe and mass production was taking hold. The European auto industry (as well as a broad suit of other industries) set out to copy the American mass-production model and thet began to achieve their goals at Wolfburg, Flins, and Mirafiori. They even began to imitate Detroit (though 30 years later) by importing cheap and supposedly docile foreign labor to take the assembly line jobs.
The real drama was elsewhere, in Japan, but it remained long concealed from American and European attention. One can just as well call volume flexible production or lean production the Toyota system or, in parallel to Fordism, Toyotaism.
In 1962 Detroit produced more cars in a week than Japan produced in a year. During the 1950s or sixties or even seventies Toyota had no possibility of successfully competing with Ford, or FIAT, Volkswagen, Renault or Austin. But they didn't have to. The Japanese government succeeded in keeping the Americans and the Europeans out of the Japanese auto market. The foreigners could not import product; they could not establish subsidiaries to produce in Japan. They could only license technology, which eventually the weakest of them did.
Without these thirty years of complete protection, Japan's story would be very different.
Whatever neoclassical economists may argue, this is clearly a major case where protectionism worked.
The rest of the story, however, is a tale of inspired Japanese innovation. Eiji Toyoda and his brilliant chief engineer, Taiichi Ohno, are generally credited with masterminding the series of organizational innovations that cumulated in the volume flexible production system and the Japanese triumph in automobiles which lies behind the meteoric rise of Japanese economic, financial and technological power.
Aided, it turned out, by powerful constraints --very little capital and a small market --Toyota improvised some fundamental innovations. Instead of dedicating huge die presses to making a specific part --standard practice in Detroit or Wolfburg --Toyota worked out ways to change dies quickly, ultimately in a matter of minutes, thus permitting much shorter runs and radically economizing on capital and on inventory. A first astonishing discovery was made:
when all indirect costs were added up, it actually cost less per part to make small batches this way, by quick die changes, than to organize for dedicated equipment and enormous runs. But to do this necessitated passing responsibility and capability for changing dies to the line workers, not to specialized teams as in the mass production plants of the West.
This lead to a second innovation that gave authority to stop the line to the line workers, something unheard of (to this day) in most Western plants. If something was wrong in a Detroit plant, it was put aside for re-work; the line kept moving (and defects kept piling up for re-work).
Eventually, but not always, teams of specialists descended to analyze the problem and plan changes. At Toyota at the first detection of a defect, the line would stop; the work team would undertake a simple, but extensive diagnostic drill until they could find the cause of the problem and fix it. Eventually the Toyota line, which could be stopped by any worker, stopped less frequently than the American or European lines which are never supposed to stop.
The prize here was the end of the classic trade off: quality for price. Toyota got higher quality (no defects) at lower price. A Toyota plant now has almost no area of the plant at the end of the assembly line for re-work. An American or European plant has some 20% of the floor space for this function which eats up some 25% of labor time! Those skilled craftsmen in white lab coats at the end of the Mercedes line, who are so prominently featured in the advertisements, are skillfully fixing defects. They shouldn't be there in the first place. Their work is all a waste.
And this process amounts to over 25% of the direct labor (and probably more of the indirect labor). 7 Jaguar is worse; it is a completely primitive mess. Their greatest investments in recent years have had to be in customer service; defects again, in gay profusion. By comparison with
Renault or Mercedes, the Toyota line yields almost no defects. There is no re-work area. There are no skilled craftsmen either doing re-work at the end of the line or posing for advertising photos.
The emblematics of this revolutionary new production system are becoming well known: concreteness and its accessability.) High-volume flexible production is a decisively superior approach to production in a broad set of industries, the industries that constitute the heartland of the European economy. It is not buyable in the sense of being lodged in tools and equipment. It is not easy to set-up in the sense that a few executive orders will close the gap. But there is no way to stay competitive over time without changing to high-volume flexible production. For the large organizations that dominate the European economy, the change will be, at best, painful and also generative of serious dislocations and problems. The fact that the Japanese auto producers out produced and reduced the American giants is well known, though its modalities deserve more careful attention then they have received. Table 5 shows that the European producers are in even worse shape than the Americans and, whatever they may think, they have not yet had the direct, blood-letting shock of massive direct competition to force them to improve, while, at the same time, depriving them of the means and the time to make those improvements.
II. America's Response to the Transition:
How has the United States economy responded to the basic transition in the international competitive environment driven by the radical changes in the extent of international competition, radical changes in the nature of international competition (the rise of the development state), and a revolution in the organization of production?
There is no single indicator of the competitive performance of a giant national economy, no proverbial bottom line. A large number of individual indicators, however, paint a picture --like the pixels on the flat panel display that both U.S. and European companies seem to have such difficulty producing. The picture is not encouraging.
The most dramatic indicator of a troubled U.S. adjustment to the new dynamics of international competition is our gargantuan deficit in international trade. Table 6 charts its growth. A trade deficit, however, or even a deficit in current account is not by itself necessarily bad. The U.S. ran a trade deficit for well over the first hundred years of its existence, borrowing money in Europe to purchase the capital goods that permitted its rapid industrialization. But for almost 100 years, until the early 1970s, the U.S. ran a surplus in its merchandise trade. It has run a deficit since the early 1970s, and that deficit has grown to a hithertofore unimaginable and currently unmanageable scale.
The current U.S. deficit differs from the early U.S. deficit in two important ways. First, it
is not the result of imports of investment goods that would in the long term improve the fundamental productivity of the U.S. economy and thereby provide the means for an improved U.S. trade balance and an re-equilibrium at the world scale. Second, its colossal scale threatens the stability of the world economy whether it continues at its present rate, or even if somehow the trade flow should suddenly and massively reverse and the U.S. balance turn positive.
America cannot continue to run such a trade deficit indefinitely. From the viewpoint of European exporters, this is a discouraging prospect. Indeed, unless there is a marked increase in the rate of economic growth in the world, especially in the nations we once called the Third World, it is hard to imagine Europe and Japan adjusting to a $100 billion per year reversal in American trade flows. The first problem is simple to state, though difficult to answer: who would buy the products of an American export boom on the scale needed to bring the deficit down to zero? The problem gets truly horrendous if we add to that reversal a U.S. trade surplus of sufficient scale to reduce America's net foreign indebtedness. Yet, unless that colossal reversal happens the U.S. debt will continue to grow. It is one of many major time bombs ticking away underneath the international economy. Table 7 shows the concomitant fall into deep debt of America's net asset position. The line traces an unprecedented descent from the world's largest creditor, up through the early l980s, to the world's largest debtor by far by 1987. It should now be extended down past $600 billion dollars. The real Debt-for-Equity Swap will not be between the U.S. and Latin America, but between Japan and the U.S. As the U.S. has a vast amount of purchasable assets, the game could continue for some time. The debt, however, can neither be written off nor paid off; it can only be "serviced" at steadily increasing amounts, imposing a growing effect on the U.S.
commercial balance and an increasingly depressing effect on the U.S. economy.
The size of the trade deficit is a macroeconomic phenomenon; so is the debt. According to conventional economic theory, the deficit does not say much about U.S. competitiveness (although, a less conventional view would argue that it has enormous implications for economies of scale, the ability to invest, etc. and therefore does directly impact competitiveness). Whatever meaning one reads into the scale of the deficit, its composition says much about the competitive position of the U.S. economy. Table 8 shows major declines in U.S. market share in a critical set of advanced technologies --except for aerospace. (It also shows an even more pronounced weakening of Europe's position in these sectors adjusting, as it does, for intra-european trade). they are now no higher than in the early 1960s; and they fell, in absolute terms, during the 1980s.
With a few brief and painful exceptions, this is the first time in some 200 years that this has happened. The American constitutional bargain is predicated on the assumption of permanently rising real wages. The promise has not been honored, and the future does not promise a major reversal. The comparison with Europe and Japan is striking. It was not high and growing wage costs that eroded America's international trade position. The stagnation of real wages may have had a more telling effect on savings rates than the increase in income shares going to the top 5% or even 10%.
Finally, education (tables 15 and 16). In a world where capital moves at electronic speeds and technology leaks very quickly, how does a nation stay rich and powerful if it is getting relatively more dumb than its competitors. Note please the performance of the Asian NICS: these are no longer sources of cheap unskilled labor; their labor forces are in many ways more skilled than those in the U.S. and Europe, and their performance, in many high tech areas superior to that of Europe, is directly related to their educational attainments.
Together these indicators, however imperfect they may be, sketch a portrait of a troubled U.S. response to the new challenges of the international economy.
III. The Response of U.S. Policy Makers?
The response of U.S. policy makers to this poor competitive performance by the American economy is difficult to chart. There has been no clear and vigorous strategic response --certainly no positive one. But at the same time there has been a certain passive consistency and a strategic reenforcing of ideological barriers to discussion and action.
We can isolate three themes --if not strategies --that constitute America's policy response:
1. The first set of elements in U.S. policy was an array of measures, presented as a crusade. These aimed at: a) Deregulating markets in such critical areas as telecommunications, air transport and financial services (banking, brokering, etc.). After a dramatic start, the long term negative effects soon began to be felt. The severely weakened position of U.S. air carriers and banks is becoming better known every day. 8 b) Efforts to break unions, lower real wages, cut social expenditures, redistribute income towards the top. Breaking unions and lowering real wages were supposed to make American enterprise more efficient and more dynamic; lowering taxes, especially at the top, was supposed to spur initiative and to generate higher levels of savings and investment, thereby increasing competitiveness, the level of national income and, as a second order effect, increase government tax revenues without raising tax rates. As indicated above, none of these objectives was realized; wages fell, inequality increased; but savings declined, investment stagnated, competitiveness weakened and government revenues did not increase. The government did not become smaller; it did not become less intrusive or more efficient. A newly invigorated automatic market economy did not sprout up fresh from the burnt forest of the mixed economy. The State did not wither away: it grew bigger and more intrusive but ever less able either to act strategically and effectively or to achieve justice. Legitimacy declined along with efficiency. 3. The third major theme of U.S. policy is one that has gained much currency in Europe.
It is the idea that what is happening in the U.S. economy and in Europe is not so much an unwelcome but remediable deterioration of industrial activities as a movement toward a postindustrial economy of advanced services and high tech. President Reagan trumpeted this agreeable theme: "The move from an industrial society toward a 'post-industrial' service economy has been one of the greatest changes to affect the developed world since the Industrial Revolution. The progression of an economy such as America's from agriculture to manufacturing to services is a natural change".
10
The New York Stock Exchange shared that view: it declared that "a strong manufacturing sector is not a requisite for a prosperous economy." 11 Segments of the business press expressed similar views; Forbes magazine was most graphic: "Instead of ringing in the decline of our economic power, a service-driven economy signals the most advanced stage of economic development... Instead of following the Pied Piper of 'reindustrialization,' the U.S. should be concentrating its efforts on strengthening its services." 12 (In passing, we might note that America's GATT round strategy is predicated on this view that our future is in services and high tech. Along with a mid-eighties strategy of seeking through GATT a backdoor approach to fostering deregulation abroad).
The problem with this commonly expressed view is that it is, quite simply, wrong.
Worse, it is richly generative of disastrous policy. This fact, which should be central to policy-making, has been obscured by a popular myth that sees economic development as a process of sectoral succession: economies develop as they shift out of sunset industries into sunrise sectors. Agriculture is followed by industry which in turn is sloughed off to less developed places as the economy moves on to services and high technology.
Simply put, this is incorrect. It is incorrect as history and it is incorrect as policy prescription.
America did not shift out of agriculture or move it offshore. We automated it; we shifted labor out and substituted massive amounts of capital, technology, and education to increase output.
Critically, many of the high value-added service jobs which we were told would substitute for industrial activity are not substitutes; they are complements. Lose industry and you will lose, not develop, those service activities. These service activities are tightly linked to production just as the crop duster (in employment statistics a service worker) is tightly linked to agriculture. If the farm moves offshore, the crop duster does too, as does the large-animal veterinarian. Similar sets of tight linkages --but at vastly greater scale --tie "service" jobs to mastery and control of production. Many high value-added service activities are functional extensions of an ever more elaborate division of labor in production. Conventional statistics are blind to this relationship; so is input output analysis. The shift we are experiencing is not from an industrial economy to a post-industrial economy, but rather to a new kind of industrial economy.
III. 1. High Tech
The second axis of the post-industrial view focuses on high technology. It begins from a curious and ill-informed perception of high technology. It sees it as fundamentally a laboratory activity. In the U.S. policy makers discuss high tech as though it is properly undertaken by eccentric persons in white coats at Berkeley or, (for second rate stuff), at MIT or Stanford. The entrepreneurial variation of this view sees weird youngsters renting Steve Jobs' garage in Silicon
Valley to invent some improbable gadget. In all cases it is an activity that is quite separated from the economy, and especially divorced from production. Few other views are quite as destructive of an advanced economy. Science --not advanced technology --is done that way, in the Berkeley labs. And it diffuses through its own channels, usually worldwide and instantly.
Chicago, who writes: "...Strong modern economies do not seem to require a dominant manufacturing sector" (Business Week, January 27, 1986, p. 12).
Technology development, and high tech industry is another story entirely; it is tightly tied to mastery and control of production to such an extent that if you lose control of production, in a few generations --and in electronics a generation is about 2 to 3 years --you lose your technological lead. No ands, ifs or buts.
A firm cannot control what it cannot produce competitively. There is little chance to compensate for production weakness by seeking enduring technological advantage. A production disadvantage can quickly erode a firm's technological advantage. Only by capturing the "rent" on an innovation through volume sales of a product can a company amortize its R&D costs and invest in R&D for the next-generation product. The feeble American presence in the current generation of consumer electronics indicates the cost of failure to produce competitively in the previous generation. Finally, if a firm simply tries to sell a laboratory product to someone else to produce, the value of the design is lower than that of a prototype, and prototypes are valued lower than products having established markets, as each step toward the market decreases uncertainty. A producer with a strong market position can often buy a portfolio of technologies at a low price and capture the technology rents through volume sales. Just as for the economy, for the firm, manufacturing matters.
America's recent history in high technology has not been happy; in just a few short years we have lost our unchallengeable world leadership, and our position continues to decline.
America still has the world's largest electronics industry, and in many segments the most advanced, but it is rapidly approaching number two status. Europe's position is even worse.
III. 2. Electronics
Let's survey in somewhat greater detail the most important of the high tech sectors, The third characteristic is that to the extent that such a thing exists, electronics is the classic strategic industry. It is characterized by large and important externalities, by rapid and multidirectional technological spin-offs, by formidable economies of scope, scale and learning.
Some of these can be captured simply by purchasing products and applying them well; many cannot. European strategy in electronics will have to be guided by these three characteristics.
Europe must be present in electronics in a big way; it must stay on the cutting edge of both technology and velocity production to get those products to market; and, most difficult, in order with America's declining share and the persistent failure of Europe to rally, the striking shift of Korea's position in semiconductor production, coming up from nowhere to begin to challenge Europe (not just one European country) in total semiconductor production. Note, also, the data on semiconductor consumption. Semi consumption may tell a more important story than production. Japan's share keeps rising; Europe's doesn't. Korea's semiconductor consumption rose even faster than its surge in production. Semiconductors, unlike beef or autos, are not consumed by individuals; they go into things. Generally, if you are not putting many semiconductors into the product you make --and into the production system you use to make them --you are making the wrong things in the wrong way. Europe's relatively very low and relatively declining position in the consumption of semiconductors is a most serious indicator of a troubled European position in electronics.
The future does not look brighter. In the past three years national positions in emerging technologies, that is, technologies for which large markets do not currently exist but which will be of great economic importance very soon, have been examined in a series of independent studies. Each has a slightly different list of technologies, and there were several important differences in ranking. But overall the picture was quite consistent. One after another the reports sounded alarms as they documented the erosion of America's position in advanced technologies and tried to alert American policy makers to the consequences. The latest report from the U.S.
Department of Commerce is indicative.
It finds that not only is America losing its lead, but that the U.S. now trails behind Japan It is important to note that those reports place the U.S. behind Europe in only one of these technologies, Digital Imaging Technology.
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The U.S. has not mounted an organized response to its threatened position in electronics.
Europe has; but, clearly, the results are such that it will have to try something different very quickly. America simply abandoned the consumer electronics segment; recent talk about organizing a re-entry strategy around flat panel displays and digital video is met with cold indifference, if not hostility, from the White House and a lukewarm response from industry.
Only in conjunction with major foreign competitors, (and there are only a few: Philips and
Thomson from Europe or any of the big Japanese) will American players re-enter that increasingly important segment, and then only in a limited way, perhaps in signal processors and, hopefully, displays.
In the other major segments --semiconductors, semi conductor equipment, computers, display, optoelectronics, etc. --America has refused to mount a strategic response to its eroding lead, despite a plethora of warnings from industry, blue ribbon commissions, the Pentagon and informed observers of the sector. Some small and isolated efforts such as Sematech, and the U.S.-Japan semiconductor agreement have received massive publicity. But in themselves, they are too small to matter and should not be taken as the tip of any American policy iceberg. This lack of a government led response has become more important, given the existence of enormous government led efforts in Europe, Japan and Korea, and given the fact that the U.S. government's traditional method of intervention --the Defense Budget--no longer seems very effective in advanced electronics. Civilian technologies can no longer depend upon the military sector as a source of technology and early development. Indeed, the relationship has reversed: spin-off, (using military technology in the civilian sector) which played such a powerful role in the infancy of semiconductors, computers and jet aviation, to name a few, has, for the moment at least, ceded its place to spin-on, and the U.S. military finds itself, like U.S. and European electronics firms, increasingly dependent upon Japanese civilian based technology for its latest military technology.
The response of America's policy makers to the challenges of the new international competitive climate, in high tech as well as traditional industry, has been ineffective at best, destructive at worst.
What has been the European response?
IV. Europe's response: Some Observations
One could argue that the sudden acceleration in the movement for European unification --in shorthand, Europe '92 --was, to an important extent, a response to the changes in international competition I have outlined here. After all, it is no secret that European industry would gain efficiency and power from a clean and single giant market. But that was equally true and equally clear twenty years ago, or fifty years ago, when Europe was worrying about its ability to compete with giant, American mass manufacturers. And for more than five hundred years everyone has known that a unified Europe was a good idea, the only idea. Dante was perhaps the most eloquent exponent of European unification. The real question is not "Why Europe?" but rather, "Why Europe Now?" To exaggerate more than just a bit, Europe '92 is a response to the rise of Japan. Of course, it is overwhelmingly a response to bigger, more complex and more indigenous forces. The movement for European integration has now moved beyond the narrow group who generated the sudden impetus in the mid-eighties, into the realms of high politics and popular politics. But there is some truth, and much utility, in placing the sudden impetus to unification on a realization by critical segments of the big business and policy elites that the rise of Japan as an economic, financial and technological power was effectively ending the post-war international order of a bi-polar world. Europe's role in that world order was comfortable, albeit Another major current is, of course, outright, full-blown protectionism with its usual rhetoric of job counts and "adjustment periods." This view, I believe, is more credited outside, than inside, Europe. But it is always a real possibility, able always to find a real constituency.
The real vulnerabilities of key European industries re-enforces this position and makes it, ultimately, part of a final determination. That is, European protection will be maintained, or enhanced, in quite a few critical areas including the two we have chosen to focus on.
Europe needs a strategic response at the European scale. That response will rest on the scale and internal openness of the single market, but it will also entail substantial amounts of State action at the European scale to protect and, critically, to change, the structure of European industries in profound ways.
Europe will have to hold on to and strengthen it position in advanced electronics. To date, the first strategy has been the chosen approach: Use the new scale of the European market to consolidate the old national champions into European champions through consolidations, subsidization, and protection. This strategy has not worked very well and it is in imminent danger of collapse along with the industry. Bigness may well be an important attribute of successful electronics firms, but it is not the same thing as strength. Consolidations produce Bigness but not necessarily strength: witness, in the U.S., Unisys, the ailing consolidation of Burroughs and Sperry, a computer maker bigger than any European, and also a company not likely to survive much longer. GE and RCA --especially after their merger --provide another example of forging, through consolidation, an integrated electronics giant, that quickly exited both consumer electronics and semiconductors deciding that it was unable successfully to compete against the Japanese. Neither scale nor a lack of integration was its problem.
In electronics, Europe has some difficult determinations to make quickly. It must hold the sector, but it cannot hold all of it by itself. So it must decide what is essential to produce and what can be safely purchased. The problem will be made more difficult by the intractable fact that some segments will be much, much harder for the Europeans to sustain a cutting edge presence in than others, and some of those are the most attractive. Whatever strategy --or strategies --are adopted, foreign based companies and joint ventures with foreign based companies will play essential roles. Here, I would like to refer back to section I, above, that discussed differences in foreign based companies, and strategies for hosting foreign based multinationals, for they are not all the same for all purposes.
Europe, for example, need not worry about a European presence in those advanced electronics products and technologies that are available from a great many companies in many countries. These are close to commodities. Here no policy, no strategy, is needed. They should be purchased in the world market at the best prices and used by European companies in their final systems. Products made by just a few companies are more troubling, but they may be prudently treated by the same "Buy" strategy. Products made by just a few companies, but all located in one foreign country create much greater vulnerabilities. Products made by one or just a few companies all located in the same foreign country when those companies are direct competitors in the final systems in which those components are used create fatal dependencies.
The European computer industry is currently crumbling. The technological dependency of ICL on Fujitsu had become so extreme that there was no way it could introduce a next generation of product without becoming simply a de facto value added distributor for Fujitsu, a relationship it has just formalized to the consternation of Bruxelles planners. Bull, despite its large budget and substantial success, risks finding itself in a similar position vis a vis NEC.
Nixdorf had to be absorbed by Siemens, which at huge effort and enormous cost seems to be approach to production, and lost everything to the Japanese who were not allowed to run abroad after the cheapest labor and who, instead, managed to situate themselves on a new production trajectory. This path eventually led to absolute domination of that sector and substantial advantage in other segments such as semiconductors, displays, new consumer products and, ultimately, computing.
For companies in the industries we are focusing on, autos and advanced electronics, the cheap labor strategy has not worked. For countries like the U.S. or the European nations, it cannot work. The American competitiveness problem outlined above, like Europe's, is not fundamentally with cheap labor countries. It is with Japan where wage costs no longer significantly differ from those in the U.S. or Europe. A low wage European strategy to compete with high wage Japan in autos or electronics is, on the very face of it, defeatist, and it will lead, as the U.S. effort has led, to defeat. After all, American producers ran to cheap wage locations and lost market share and technology leadership. The U.S. encouraged (or at least permitted) a vast immigration of cheap labor. And the Reagan administration tried (with somewhat less but nonetheless real success), to dismantle major portions of our social support system. We even disinvested in the physical public infrastructure. America actually succeeded in lowering average wages over the past five years, and in keeping them constant in real terms over almost twenty years. All in all, a political tour de force that Europe would be hard pressed --and ill-advised --to attempt. And it was all for naught. In the sectors we have focused on the advantages from lower wages proved not to matter. Even an almost fifty percent drop in the dollar did not help.
In other industries like apparel the wage squeeze was simply not big enough.
Europe is and must remain a high wage producer. It must increase, not diminish, its investments in education and radically improve the efficiency of those investments. In a world
where capital moves at electronic speeds and technology leaks quickly how can a nation stay rich and powerful if its people become dumber than the others. America is not succeeding in answering that question, though it gives the impression of trying mightily. There is no answer other than the obvious: it can't. Mass production provided an out: it provided high paying jobs to low skilled, low educated people. The emergent mode of production, volume flexible production, offers no such protective shelter. It relies fundamentally on formal (not traditional craft) skills, on the ability to interpret symbolic data, often in mathematical form, into action. That means real, formal education.
Before Europe, in a futile quest for lower costs, sets out to dismantle its social protection system, it would be well advised to study the productive ironies of America's cost savings in such critical areas as child care, health, and social stability. These complement education and, like education and telecommunications, should be seen in the context of a realistic image of a modern production system. The old system had at its center a massive accumulation of capital in which a great many highly intelligent, highly educated people designed products and production systems in minute detail in which many more uneducated and low skilled people labored very productively to make masses of products which their high wages permitted them to consume.
Production happened inside the plant and was, in the context of reasonable public order, controllable to a critical extent. I suggest that a new image of the production process guide social policy making. Production is closer to a network in which productivity is determined by the skills and attitudes of the person on the other end of the communication line. It is not easily contained within the plant, or even the firm, however big. If he (or she) is incompetent, so are you.
For reasons that elude reason, it seems very difficult for one great nation to learn from the mistakes of another. Europe has much to learn from America's experiences these past years. I hope it can do that without repeating them.
